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ABSTRACT 
Among the many countries that underwent the democratization 
process in Africa in the mid-1990s, Malawi remains in the 
transition process while struggling to fully consolidate. 
Its parliament faces challenges impacting its performance 
of the core functions: executive oversight, constituency 
service and legislation.  Despite the challenges the Malawi 
parliament faces, it distinguished itself in 2002 when it 
helped to maintain constitutionality by denying the 
president’s bid to change the constitution to allow him to 
stand beyond the constitutional limit of two terms. Since 
then, the parliament has been less effective in performing 
its main functions.  This thesis compares the parliament’s 
performance of its core functions in the periods 1994-2004 
and 2004–2009 to explain why its performance declined over 
time. It finds that the struggle for control of the House 
undermined the parliament’s ability to perform these key 
functions, and thereby weakened the democratization 
process. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Among the many countries that underwent the democratization 
process in Africa in the mid-1990s, Malawi remains in the 
transition process while struggling to fully consolidate. Its 
parliament faces challenges impacting its performance of the 
core functions: executive oversight, constituency service and 
legislation.  Despite the challenges Malawi parliament faces, 
it distinguished itself in 2002 when it helped to maintain 
constitutionality by denying the president’s bid to change the 
constitution to allow him to stand beyond the constitutional 
limit of two terms.  
This could be attributed the fact that Muluzi’s desire to 
stand threatened the presidential aspirations of some senior 
United Democratic Front (UDF) members who consequently stood 
against him for personal reasons, which benefited democracy. 
Since then, parliament has been less effective as the struggle 
for control of parliament affected the performance of its 
functions. Taking advantage of the provision as provided for 
in the Constitution under section 59 (1), the executive 
undermined parliament in face of the struggle.  
Furthermore, parliamentary committees also contributed as 
they lacked the motivation due to poor representation, 
understaffing, underfunding and poor leadership quality. The 
challenges to the parliament’s authority became more visible 
in the face of the power struggle.  
This thesis compares parliament performance of its core 
functions in the period of 1994-2004 and 2004-9 to explain why 
its performance declined over time. It finds that the struggle 
for control of the House undermined parliament’s ability to 
perform these key functions, and thereby weakened the 
democratization process. 
 xii




 The views expressed in this thesis are entirely those 
of the author, and in no way do they represent the official 
position of the Malawi Defence Force or Malawi Government. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Decolonization in Africa started in 1957, and within 
fifteen years most African countries, that gained 
independence under multiparty systems devolved into 
military rule or one-party systems, many undergoing 
crippling civil wars.1 The “Third Wave of Democratization,” 
which began in Portugal in 1974, was late and slow in 
reaching Africa,2 arriving only in the late 1980s as the 
Cold War was coming to an end. In some cases, the 
transition from authoritarian rule stalled or was aborted, 
while in others it was followed by an initial consolidation 
of democracy reflecting longer, broader, and more complex 
processes associated with the institutionalization and 
legitimization of a new set of democratic rules.3 Transition 
and consolidation processes continue, as do recurrent 
crises of governance and internal conflicts,4 as evidenced 
by disappointing results and unfulfilled expectations two 
decades after the onset of the transition.5  
                     
1 Stephen Brown and Paul Kaiser, “Democratisations in Africa: 
Attempts, hindrances and prospects,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, 
No. 6 (2007),1131. 
2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 21, 
25. 
3 Linda J. Beck, “Senegal’s ‘Patrimonial Democrats:’ Incremental 
Reform and the Obstacles to the Consolidation of Democracy,” Canadian 
Journal of African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1997),1-2. 
4 Chris Fomunyoh, “Francophone Africa in flux: democratization in 
fits and starts,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2001):37-50; 
Nicolas van de Welle, “Africa’s range of regimes,” Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2002), 66-80. 
5 Carlos Santiso and Augustin Loada, “Explaining the unexpected: 
electoral reform and democratic governance in Burkina Faso,” Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2003), 409. 
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In Southern Africa, South Africa and Namibia are 
moving along the path to democratic consolidation, while 
Zimbabwe and Angola remain authoritarian, and Malawi and 
most of the other countries are somewhere in the middle (or 
are caught in the initial phases of the democratic 
transition).6 What explains this variation?   
A number of factors affect the quality and quantity of 
the democratic progress. One school of thought highlights 
the role of institutional engineering. Bierschenk argues 
that decentralizing governmental structures has a positive 
effect on democratization’s chances of success by opening 
up the political arena to new players.7 Santiso and Loada 
argue similarly that institutional transformation and 
electoral reform increases the likelihood of successful 
democratization in unfavorable environments.8 They do this 
by shaping the incentive structures of elites and the 
distribution of political outcomes to a higher level of 
political competition and qualitative improvement in the 
democratization process.9  
A second group of scholars highlight the variable role 
of civil society in supporting democratization. Banjo 
asserts that social groups that are cohesive are more 
likely to enhance regime change than those that are divided 
                     
6 John W. Harbeson, “Electoral Systems and Democratization in 
Southern Africa,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 1 
(March 2000), 224. 
7 Thomas Bierschenk, “The local appropriation of democracy: an 
analysis of the municipal elections in Parakou, Republic of Benin,” 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2006), 543-544. 
8 Santiso and Loada, “Explaining the unexpected: electoral reform 
and democratic governance in Burkina Faso,” 396. 
9 Ibid. 
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and pursuing different goals.10 He argues that citizen 
mobilization against the regime of Matthew Kerekou 
contributed significantly to the creation of a new 
constitutional order, which in turn supported a more far-
reaching democratization process than experienced by many 
other countries in the region.11 Blair concurs with Banjo, 
maintaining that civil action widens participation by 
mobilizing marginalized groups into public life, especially 
the poor, women and minorities.12 Furthermore, institutions 
of civil society protect citizens against excesses by the 
state acting as a buffer against possible predatory 
behavior and monitoring public performance on human rights 
abuses and corruption. In addition, civil society helps 
guarantee government accountability by undertaking 
communication, representation, and negotiation through 
which citizen’s preferences are heard and acted upon.13  
In Malawi, religious groups and civil society 
organizations were instrumental in forcing the ruling 
regime to accept democratic principles. The Roman Catholic 
Church, through the pastoral letter, helped in changing the 
attitudes of Malawians and was key in challenging and 
undermining Banda’s authoritarian rule. During Muluzi’s bid 
                     
10 Adewale Banjo, “The Politics of Succession Crisis in West Africa: 
The Case of Togo,” The International Journal of World Peace, Vol. XXV, 
No. 2 (June 2008), 35. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Harry Blair, "Doing Democracy in the Third World: Developing An 
Applied Theory of Civil Society," paper for the Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C., (2-5 
September 1993), 7. 
13 Ibid.; Michael Bratton, “Civil Society and Political Transition 
in Africa,” Institute for Development Research Report, Vol. 11, No.6 
(1994), 10. 
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for a third term in 2002/3, the church in addition to 
holding prayers against the bid also organized prayer 
meetings against Muluzi’s bid. The influence of the church 
proved vital in undermining Muluzi’s bid for a third term.14 
The mass media has also been identified as an 
explanatory factor in shaping the process of 
democratization. Carlene Edie maintains that the mass media 
is capable of generating a free flow of ideas on political 
events and issues, thereby enriching the role of public 
opinion in participatory politics and enabling the public 
to make rational choices and to hold politicians 
accountable for their actions, hence playing a role in 
democratization process.15 Nwajiaku agrees with Edie and 
states that the revelation by the independent press on how 
France was dictating the transition process in Benin made 
things worse, as it alluded to the fact that the transition 
was being designed to guarantee the president’s position.16 
Banjo asserts that, in Togo, unlike in Benin, the 
independent newspapers and electronic media were not 
allowed to operate freely, thereby preventing the masses 
from making informed decisions, and affecting the 
                     
14 Kenneth R. Ross, “Worrisome Trends: The Voice of the Churches in 
Malawi’s Third Term Debate,” African Affairs, Vol. 103, No.410 (2004), 
91-107. 
15 Carlene J. Edie, “Democracy in the Gambia: Past, Present and the 
Prospects for the Future,” African Development, Vol. XXV, Nos. 3&4 
(2000), 172.  
16 Kathryn Nwajiaku, “The National Conferences in Benin and Togo 
Revisited,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 
(Sept., 1994), 438-9. 
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democratization process.17 This demonstrates the important 
role of mass media in helping the democratization process. 
A third camp highlights the effect of external actors 
in the democratization process in Africa. By the late 
1980s, almost half of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
were bankrupt and most of the other countries were being 
supported by Western public capital.18 Richard Joseph argues 
that despite the fact that some African regimes strongly 
resisted the demands of international financial 
institutions to change their failed economic policies, 
their growing budgetary shortages forced them to 
capitulate. The reluctance of their bilateral partners to 
continue providing relief, coupled with lack of interest of 
private banks in the continent, necessitated their 
acceptance of highly conditional loans from the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank that in essence 
eroded their popular support.19 
 The Marxist regime in Benin was the first to permit 
multiparty elections, which resulted in Soglo, a former 
World Bank official, ousting the incumbent. Zambia, like 
another early “domino” to fall, followed.20 Kandeh concurs 
                     
17 Banjo, “The Politics of Succession Crisis in West Africa: The 
Case of Togo,” 43. 
18 Nicolas van de Walle, “Neopatrimonalism and Democracy in Africa, 
with an Illustration from Cameroon,” in Jennifer A. Widner, ed., 
Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 135. 
19 Richard Joseph, “Democratization in Africa after 1989: 
Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 
29, No. 3, Transition to Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of 
Dankwart A. Rustow (April, 1997), 369. 
20 Jan Kees van Donge, “Kamuzu’s Legacy: The Democratization of 
Malawi: Or Searching for the Rules of the Game in African Politics,” 
African Affairs, Vol. 94, No 375 (Apr, 1995), 231. 
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with van Donge on the role of external actors in the 
success of the democratization process in Africa.21 However, 
he looks at the role that donor aid plays in this process. 
He argues that the way donor funds were managed by the 
Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) had a direct impact on 
the elections.22 Secondly, he argues that donor aid helps in 
the democratization process by strengthening the 
operational capacity of state institutions and many local 
non-governmental organizations. He points out that it would 
have been impossible for the National Electoral Commission 
(NEC) in Sierra Leone to conduct free and fair elections 
had it not been for the support of external donors.23 By 
breathing new life into the NEC and other state 
institutions, Kandeh argues that capacity-building 
assistance from donors made it extremely difficult for the 
SLPP to rig the elections.24  
The economic sanctions that were placed on Malawi 
during Banda’s rule helped to create favorable conditions 
for multiparty politics during the 1990s. Pressure from the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other 





                     
21 Jimmy D. Kandeh, “Rogue incumbents, donor assistance and Sierra 
Leone’s second post-conflict elections of 2007,” Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol 46, No. 4 (2006), 605. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 606. 
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his authoritarian rule and allow the opposition to 
participate in politics by conducting campaigns and 
participating in elections.25 
Finally, the role of the military is considered to be 
an important factor in the democratization process. Collier 
argues that the military is often considered a threat to 
democratic regimes where the men in uniform choose to take 
power from democratically elected leaders.26 On the positive 
side, the military can support democratization processes by 
ousting dictatorial regimes through coups or threats of 
coups, or by refusing to support incumbents who attempt to 
overstay their welcome in power. He argues his case by 
referring to the events in Senegal in 2000, when the 
military played an important role by forcing the incumbent 
to accept his defeat in the elections or face a coup.27  
Just as in Senegal, Finer argues that the military in 
Turkey also played a significant role in the 
democratization process by arresting President Bayar and 
his ministers, who were accused of harassing and 




                     
25 Jan Kees van Donge, “Kamuzu’s Legacy: The Democratization of 
Malawi: Or Searching for the Rules of the Game in African Politics,” 
African Affairs, Vol. 94, No 375 (Apr, 1995), 231. 
26 Paul Collier, Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous 
Places, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2009), 144. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military 
in Politics, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 
38. 
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to democracy by restoring rights and freedoms, drawing up a 
new constitution, and conducting free elections in October 
1961.29  
In Malawi, the military helped in the democratization 
process by dismantling Banda’s paramilitary wing the Malawi 
Young Pioneers. In addition to the factors discussed above, 
the actions of the army weakened Banda’s rule by removing 
his terror machinery, rendering him vulnerable.30 
Surprisingly, the role of democratic institutions 
themselves in strengthening or weakening young democratic 
regimes, while noted, is less well studied. Edie notes that 
a weak judiciary is a hindrance to democratization because 
it is unable to protect political rights in the competitive 
party system by enforcing constitutional guarantees that 
guard against their violation.31 Similarly, a strong 
judiciary is more able to protect individual freedoms that 
are granted under the law, and to limit the power that the 
state can exercise over the individual.32 However, he does 
not explore the variation in judicial performance over 
time.  
Bierschenk argues that the Constitutional Court in 
Benin played its role as a guardian of the Constitution, 
                     
29 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military 
in Politics, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 
38. 
30 Kings M. Phiri, “A Case of Revolutionary Change in Contemporary 
Malawi: The Malawi Army and the Disarming of the Malawi Young 
Pioneers,” Journal of Peace, Conflicts and Military Studies, Vol. 1, 
No. 1 (March 2000), 1-7. 
31 Eddie, “Democracy in the Gambia: Past, Present and the Prospects 
for the Future.” 172. 
32 Ibid. 
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thereby contributing to the democratization process, which 
resulted in Benin having no political prisoners, but again, 
without explaining why.33 Barkan makes a similar argument 
about legislatures: weak ones cannot effectively perform 
their oversight duties, while strong ones positively 
contribute to the democratization process by acting as an 
effective check and balance on the executive.34 But again, 
these authors do not explain why legislatures sometimes 
perform these roles and sometimes do not.  
By using a case study of Malawi, this thesis seeks to 
answer the question of why some countries have not yet 
fully consolidated their democracies. This study discusses 
how parliament in Malawi is performed, because it considers 
parliament to be key in determining the level of 
democratization. The discussion shows that although the 
legislature played a strong role in democratic transition 
initially, it later floundered.  This thesis argues that 
politics of survival affected how parliament transacted 
business after 2000, negatively impacting its core 
functions. A qualitative within-case comparison method will 
be used to investigate this argument, comparing the period 
1994-2004 to the period 2004-9. In the first period, 
despite facing challenges of limited meeting time and 
funding mainly for parliamentary committees and staffing,  
 
 
                     
33 Bierschenk, “The local appropriation of democracy: an analysis of 
the municipal elections in Parakou, Republic of Benin,” 546. 
34 Joel D Barkan, “African Legislatures and the “Third Wave” of 
Democratization,” Preliminary Draft, prepared for Yale/World Bank 
Workshop on Governance and Development in Africa and the Middle East to 
be held at Yale University, January 30-31, 2009 (12/30/2008), 3. 
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parliament was relatively effective in performing its 
functions, while in the later period it did virtually 
nothing. 
The legislature is deemed an important institution at 
two levels for the deepening of democracy. Firstly, it 
passes laws, working independently or with the executive. 
This process calls for bargaining and compromise between 
rival interests, lest the legislature just provide approval 
for executive interests.35 Secondly, it performs executive 
oversight, ensuring vertical accountability of rulers to 
the ruled and horizontal accountability of all government 
agencies to the legislature which represents the people.36  
Parliamentary committees are critically important, as 
their level of expertise impacts the ability of Members of 
Parliament (MPs) to question and counter executive bills 
and exercise effective oversight.37 It is precisely because 
legislatures are both representative bodies and instruments 
for horizontal and vertical accountability that an 
institutionalized legislature is a defining attribute of 
all democracies.38 Those parliaments that are merely approve 
the executive’s interests weaken the democratization 
process by legitimizing undemocratic tendencies of the 
executive, while those that exercise control over the 
                     
35 Barkan, “African Legislatures and the “Third Wave” of 
Democratization,” 3. 
36 Barkan, “Legislatures on the Rise: Progress in Retreat in 
Africa,” 125. 
37 Patel and Tostensen, “Parliamentary-Executive Relations,” 4-5. 
38 Joel D. Barkan, “Legislative Development in Africa,” in 
“Democratization in Africa: What Progress towards 
Institutionalization?” Conference Report, CR 2008-01, Ghana Center for 
Democratic Development, 4-6 October 2007 (February 2008), 16. 
 11
executive enhances the democratization process by acting as 
a check and balance. Constituency service by individual 
legislators, however, is also important in maintaining 
links between the governors and the governed, and in 
maintaining popular support.39  
In the context of Africa, constituency service 
generally involves basic needs like roads, clean water, 
health facilities, schools and recreation facilities, among 
others.40 These functions, however, are always in conflict 
with each other, and call for bargaining and compromise 
across the many competing interests.41 Thus, the following 
chapters investigate the performance of the Malawi 
legislature in the core areas of executive oversight, 





                     
39 Barkan, “Legislatures on the Rise: Progress in Retreat in 
Africa,” 126. 
40 Ibid.   
41 Ibid. 
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II. PARLIAMENT IN MALAWI (1994-2004) 
At the dawn of independence, the parliament in Malawi 
was modeled after the British parliament. The Constitution 
provided for political pluralism and allowed people to 
compete in an election for political office.42 In August 
1964, roughly a month after independence, a major political 
crisis led to the consolidation of the supremacy of the 
ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and President Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda, and the reduction of the authority of the 
parliament.43 In the face of opposition to Banda’s 
authoritarian style from his own ministers, parliament gave 
Banda an overwhelming vote of confidence.44 In 1966 it 
adopted a new constitution that abolished multiparty 
politics and formally established a one-party state. In 
1970 Banda was declared life president of the MCP and a 
year later, he became the life president of Malawi, a 
position he held until 1994, when parties reasserted 
themselves.45  
On May 17, 1994, Malawi conducted its first multiparty 
elections. The presidential election, deemed free and fair 
by the international community, was won by Dr. Bakili 
                     
42 Clement Ng’ong’ola, “Judicial Mediation in Electoral Politics in 
Malawi,” in Harri Englund, A Democracy of Chameleon: POLITICS AND 
CULTURE IN THE NEW MALAWI, (Blantyre, CLAIM/MABUKU, 2002), 63.  




45 Nandini Patel, Richard Tambulasi, Bright Molande and Andrew 
Mpesi, “Consolidating Democratic Governance in Southern Africa: 
Malawi,” EISA Research Report, No. 33 (2007), 5. 
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Muluzi head of the United Democratic Front (UDF).46 In the 
parliamentary elections, UDF won eighty-five seats, MCP 
fifty-six and Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) thirty six.47 
Thus, no party won the two-thirds majority required by the 
Constitution to conduct legislative business, or even the 
fifty percent required to pass bills.  This successful 
transition, and the balance of power in the legislature, 
brought high hopes that parliament would be independent, 
although everyone expected the democratization process to 
remain delicate.48 As in all new democracies, democratic 
consolidation was limited by the legislature’s inability to 
fully exercise its authority vis-à-vis the executive. 
This chapter examines how the legislature performed 
its core functions oversight, constituency service, and 
legislation in the first decade of multiparty politics. It 
argues that despite having just emerged from thirty years 
of dictatorial rule, parliament played a significant role 
that was a dramatic departure from the politics of hero 
worship that characterized the single-party parliament. 
Furthermore, despite the challenges that the legislature 
faced, especially the limited meeting time and financial 
and personnel deficits in various parliamentary committees,  
 
 
                     
46 Peter VonDoepp, “The Survival of Malawi’s enfeebled democracy.” 
232: Blessings Chinsinga, “Malawi’s Democracy Project at a Crossroads,” 
in Towards the Consolidation of Malawi’s Democracy, Occasional Paper 
No. 11, (Lilongwe: Konrad-Adenauer-Stuftung, 2008), 7. 
47 Nandini Patel, Richard Tambulasi, Bright Molande and Andrew 
Mpesi, “Consolidating Democratic Governance in Southern Africa: 
Malawi,” 36. 
48 Blessings Chinsinga, “Malawi’s Democracy Project at a 
Crossroads,” 7. 
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it was able to stand above party politics when it mattered 
most, ensuring that the democratic process was not entirely 
derailed.  
A. PARLIAMENTARY EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT FUNCTION 
Upon moving from one-party to multiparty politics, the 
parliament in Malawi was given the mandate to exercise 
executive oversight as provided for under sections 89(3) 
and 96(1)(e) of the Constitution. During this period, 
however, the oversight function of parliament was affected 
by a number of factors, including the time factor.  
Although section 59(2) of the Constitution mandates 
parliament to meet at least twice a year, this does not 
provide sufficient time to enable MPs and the various 
committees to exercise oversight. Malawi parliament has 
seventy-five to one hundred sitting days in a year. For 
oversight to be performed properly, parliamentarians need 
time to study policy proposals and bills and to prepare for 
debate. Although, parliamentary Standing Orders provide for 
a twenty-eight day period between tabling and debate of 
bills (Standing Order 116(1) Malawi Parliament 2003: 45), 
this has often been waived (as provided for in Standing 
Order 117, Malawi Parliament 2003: 46).49 The period of 
2000-4 witnessed more waivers (twelve) and even the complex 
and important budget document had not been spared. Most MPs 
view waivers as an infringement by the executive on 
legislative powers to hold the executive accountable. 
Legislators argue that waivers disable them from exercising 
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their duties as they are left with little time to do 
research, and to consult and solicit advice from expert, 
which results in brief and uniformed debates in the House. 
Inadequate time leads to parliament passing executive 
sponsored bills without much debate as less time leads to 
more pressure from the executive on parliament to pass 
sensitive and important bills.50 This consequently affects 
the level of the democratization process since the strength 
of the parliament determines the quality and level of the 
democratization process. 
In addition, staffing and underfunding also affected 
the oversight function. Parliamentary committees have 
members of various parties represented in parliament 
through a selection that is based on personal favoritism 
rather than merits, capacity or interest. The way members 
are selected to various committees affects the efficacy of 
the committees and parliament in exercising oversight. 
Selecting members to the committees based on their 
interests and merit could have enhanced the efficacy of the 
parliament and committees. Time for debates on motions or 
bills could have been shortened through thorough and solid 
preparatory work in the various committees, thereby cutting 
the time needed to discuss the same in plenary of the 
House.51 
Parliament is also faced with the problem of funding, 
which affects how it conducts business and holds the 
executive accountable, negatively affecting the 
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parliamentary contribution towards democracy. Though the 
Clerk of parliament yearly prepares the budget, it is 
always cut by the Treasury. Since most MPs are accommodated 
in hotels during the sitting of parliament, this impact on 
the duration of sittings and with little time available to 
discuss and get expert advice, the quality of contributions 
during debates is equally compromised.52 Additionally, the 
committees lack facilities and support functions as 
demonstrated by seventeen committees all sharing two 
researchers and four secretaries with poor computer 
services. This is further complicated by the caliber and 
dynamism of committee chairs with regard to their level of 
education, knowledge of the substance of their committee 
briefs and command of procedure.53 These factors combined 
affected the ability of parliament to fully exercise its 
functions and contribute positively toward the 
democratization process.  
Despite the challenges above, parliament was able to 
exercise its powers and hold the executive accountable as 
established in the Constitution. Section 89(3) requires the 
president to appear annually in parliament and address the 
House on government policies and the state of the nation. 
Additionally, the president is required to answer 
questions, which he has done on a few occasions in both 
periods of study.54 
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Furthermore, under section 96(1)(e), cabinet ministers 
are required to report to parliament on their respective 
ministries and to answer questions from the House, when 
called to do so. In both periods of study this happened 
frequently, though some ministers had been called more than 
others, depending on the issues at hand that parliament 
needed clarification on. Moreover, during this period, 
ministers responsible for statutory corporations or 
parastatals as per legal requirement did present annual 
reports on institutional performance to the House. 
Parliament as a whole was again able to exercise its 
authority when it shifted money from an office of president 
and cabinet item to education in 1994, and denied funds for 
a new National Intelligence Bureau as it was allegedly 
illegal in 2004.55 Lastly, once the need arose, the select 
committees of parliament, using their mandates, have been 
able to demand and get documents from the executive for 
scrutiny.56 
Apart from parliament as a whole, the various 
committees of parliament have also been active in 
exercising the executive oversight function. The Budget and 
Finance Committee is critical to effective oversight of 
government spending.  During its formative stages (1995/6), 
the committee advised parliament on judicial salaries and 
packages that were deemed important to ensuring the 
independence of the judiciary. During this period, the 
Committee was able to engage the services of consultants to 
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advise it on inflation, budget deficit, gender equity 
concerns, and analysis of the national budget. Towards the 
end of 2001, the Budget and Finance Committee established a 
task force on poverty reduction as a way of devoting its 
energies to poverty reduction concerns.57 Starting in 2002, 
the Budget and Finance Committee began to target specific 
health-care programs as priorities in the country’s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and national budget. Within 
the same period, the committee also monitored government 
performance with regards to health-care programs, and 
lobbied the government to ensure that priority poverty 
expenditures (PPEs) were integrated into the larger 
monitoring and evaluation system of the PRSP review. 58 The 
committee also tracked allocations for PPEs from the 
Ministry of Finance through Ministry of Health.  
In addition, the Human Immune-deficiency 
Virus/Acquired Immune-deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) 
subcommittee of parliament made recommendations to the 
executive in October 2003 for improving the country’s 
response to the pandemic. The recommendation, which were 
adopted and incorporated in government policies on 
HIV/AIDS, included establishing a parliamentary standing 
committee on HIV/AIDS, ensuring that allocated expenditures 
for HIV/AIDS are protected, providing for MPs to undergo 
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voluntary testing, making parliament an ex-officio member 
of the National Aids Commission Board, and requesting that 
churches take a silent policy on condom issues.59 The 
recommendations acted as guideline in enabling the 
committee to monitor how the executive was spending on 
HIV/AIDS and measures taken to curb the problem and hold 
government ministries and departments accountable where it 
was failing. This was a good development for democracy as 
it entailed executive oversight. 
The Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee revealed 
irregularities in the procurement of notebooks (the Field 
York case) by Minister of Education Sam Mpasu in 1994, who 
was later removed from his position by the president.60 The 
Field York case involving Mpasu demonstrates lack of an 
enforcement mechanism, as despite proving beyond doubt that 
he was in the wrong, parliament could not do anything apart 
from waiting for the executive to act because it lacked the 
mandate to do so.61  
Another committee of parliament which did well during 
this period was the Public Accounts Committee. Through 
scrutiny of expenditures, it was able to reveal massive 
corruption occurring within government ministries and 
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departments.62 In July 2000, the committee published a 
report implicating ministers and top government officials 
in a multi-million kwacha fraud involving shoddy government 
contracts. In response, the president dropped those 
implicated in the fraud, including close allies Cassim 
Chilumpha, Brown Mpinganjira and Peter Chupa, from the 
cabinet, indicating effective parliamentary-executive 
oversight. 63  
Although parliament and the committees were able to 
perform the oversight function, they faced challenges 
ranging from lack of enforceability of their decisions, 
understaffing to insufficient time to meet and deliberate 
issues, a requirement for effective oversight. Parliament 
and its various committees lack the mechanism to enforce 
disciplinary measures once executive wrongdoing is 
established.64  
In conclusion, although parliament faced some 
challenges in terms of funding and staffing, it still 
managed to exercise some oversight as demonstrated by the 
revelation of irregularities and fraud in government 
ministries and departments. Donors who held an interest 
provided most of the support for the functioning of 
committees. The performance of executive oversight 
indicated a realization among legislators that they have a 
role to play in the democratization process as a multiparty 
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presence calls for checks and balances on the executive. 
Executive oversight helped to ensure accountability and 
improved transparency among the various government 
institutions.  
In the case of HIV/AIDS issues, the role of parliament 
was essential in ensuring that those affected by the 
pandemic were not segregated against in society and the 
work-place based on their status. By improving 
accountability and transparency and protecting the rights 
of those affected by HIV/AIDS, parliament was instrumental 
in enhancing democratic principles, which contributed 
toward maintaining political and civil rights and the rule 
of law. This is vital in preventing a return to one party 
rule. 
B. LEGISLATORS PERFORMANCE OF CONSTITUENCY SERVICES 
Malawi legislators played an important role in 
improving the living conditions of their constituents in 
this decade. Legislators met with their constituents on a 
number of occasions in order to discuss ways the government 
could deliver better HIV/AIDS services. Parliament passed a 
law in 2003 requiring the Ministry of Health to give out 
food supplements and anti-retroviral treatments to those 
diagnosed with HIV/AIDS. Parliament also monitored budget 
allocations for anti-retroviral treatment throughout the 
period.65 Additionally, in 2003 through an act of 
parliament, parliament was able to secure funds within the 
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national budget for HIV drugs.66 As a result of the 2003 
law, it is now mandatory for government ministries, 
departments and district and city assemblies to allocate at 
least two percent of their budgets to HIV activities.67 
Through these actions, legislators helped to improve the 
government’s delivery of HIV/AIDS services to constituents. 
Legislators have been involved in providing some basic 
services to their constituents. Legislators provided 
coffins for those who could not afford them, ferried 
patients to hospitals (either personally or by allowing 
their cars to be used for that purpose), and attended 
church fundraising events, weddings and engagement 
ceremonies.68 In liaison with chiefs, MPs have mobilized 
constituents in developmental projects like molding bricks 
for the construction of schools, teachers’ houses, and 
clinics too. Legislators also contributed to development in 
their constituencies, by helping to secure funding for 
various developmental self-help projects.69  
For instance, a legislator in the north helped his 
constituents find funding from the Malawi Social Action 
Fund (MASAF) and European Union (EU) for construction of 
school blocks, a Malawi Center of Distance Education (MCDE) 
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and a bridge. A legislator in the south helped in 
initiating self-help projects with funding from MASAF, the 
American Embassy and the EU and convinced a private farmer 
to pay for a piped water project for the local village. 
Furthermore, the legislator had a hand in encouraging 
students and parents to mold bricks for the expansion and 
repair of every primary school in his constituency. One 
legislator managed to secure funding for the construction 
of over ten primary schools in his constituency within one 
year.70  
Legislators were also vital in promoting the welfare 
of their constituents through cooperation with Non 
Governmental Organizations (NGOs). After realizing that his 
constituents were drinking polluted water during the rainy 
season, a legislator in the south convinced World Vision 
International to provide funding to dig wells, which he 
helped to supervise.71 Another legislator in the center had 
several boreholes repaired by tirelessly phoning the 
district water office and asked them when the repair work 
would be finished.72  
In the south, a legislator drove from her constituency 
to Blantyre where she picked up a technician from the 
Ministry of Irrigation and Water Affairs, took him to a 
broken borehole and demanded that he fix it immediately. In 
another case, two legislators managed to double the number 
of secondary schools that were to be built in their 
constituencies by attending a district development 
                     




committee meeting and putting forward the request for 
secondary schools in their constituencies.73 Legislators had 
realized by this time that their political survival was 
dependent on how well they performed constituency service 
in comparison to the other functions.74  
C. HOW PARLIAMENT EXERCISED THE POWER OF LEGISLATION 
The UDF entered into a coalition with AFORD in 1994 to 
establish a working majority in the House. In the next five 
years, parliament passed several bills. The Constitution 
Amendment Act 1994 empowered the president to appoint a 
second vice president if he deemed it proper in the 
interest of the nation, and limited the first and second 
vice presidents to a term of five years or the end of the 
president’s five-year term of office, whichever was 
sooner.75 The bill was important because it limited the 
powers of the president over his vice or second vice 
president with regard to terms of office. This prevented 
the president from unilaterally removing his vice and 
second vice president without following procedure in case 
of conflict between them, which is good for democracy. 
In 1995, two additional constitutional amendments were 
passed. Amendment Act 1995 required the state to provide 
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funds to parties with more than one-tenth of the national 
vote in parliament and limited disqualifications of persons 
elected as legislators to convictions for crimes involving 
dishonesty or moral turpitude that occurred within seven 
years. Amendment (No.2) Act 1995 placed the director of 
public prosecution under special directions of the attorney 
general. It also amended section 88(3), which required the 
president and members of the cabinet to declare, within 
three months of being elected, all assets, liabilities, and 
business interests as well as those in the possession of 
their spouses or held on their behalf. A new provision 
introduced as section 213 gave the same requirement to 
members of parliament and the Senate, public officers and 
senior officers of statutory bodies.76 This was important 
for ensuring that the wealth office bearers accumulate is 
in line with their positions and that there is no abuse of 
government resources. 
Constitution (Amendment) Act 1998 put the term of 
parliament from the day of swearing to day of dissolution 
to a five-year term, and also limited the president’s term 
to five years, while aligning the first vice and second 
vice presidents’ terms to that of president.77 These 
amendments were good for democracy because the setting of 
term limits meant that the tenure of the president or the 
parliament could not be reduced or extended beyond the  
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required period without reasonable grounds. This acted as a 
control measure against those in office who wanted to 
extend their stay without procedure.  
The Communication Act, passed in November 1998, 
established an independent body, the Malawi Communications 
Regulatory Authority (MACRA), to regulate all forms of 
communications, removing this task from the president’s 
office.78 The Act also restructured the Malawi Posts and 
Telecommunications Corporation (MPTC) into separate 
telecommunications and postal businesses, and privatized 
the postal services. Furthermore, the Act resulted in the 
reconstitution of the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation 
(MBC). MACRA was given the power to regulate the airwaves 
and license broadcasters that met set requirements, which 
was important because it placed powers in the hands of an 
independent body which would be less influenced by 
political decisions than the initial office of the 
president.79  
The Communications Act was supported by legislators 
from UDF, AFORD, and the opposition MCP. The creation of 
the office of second vice president was opposed by MCP 
legislators and protested by civil society, while the 
repeal of section 64 was protested by religious groups, 
civil society organizations and other human rights groups.80 
Nevertheless, the legislations were passed, and Chakufwa 
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Chihana went on to assume the office of the second vice 
president. Additionally, Constitution (Amendment) Act 1999 
was passed in November 1998 when it became apparent that 
due to logistical problems, it was not feasible to hold 
1999 parliamentary and presidential elections as provided 
for in the Constitution. The amendment provided that the 
elections be held not later than June 15, 1999, as 
appointed by the electoral commission.81 These amendments 
helped to create a favorable environment for democracy by 
ensuring that all institutions and actions taken are 
enacted in the Constitution. 
The democratization process began to face a lot of 
challenges and democracy was put to the real test in the 
period 1999-2004. In the parliamentary elections of 1999, 
the UDF won ninety-three seats, MCP sixty-six, AFORD 
twenty-nine, and four went to independent legislators who 
joined the UDF after the elections.82 One disputed outcome 
was overturned in favor of the UDF, and a by-election 
yielded yet another seat. Thus the UDF held ninety-nine 
seats to the opposition alliance’s ninety-three (MCP sixty-
four, AFORD twenty-nine), giving it a legislative majority, 
but not the required two-thirds majority needed for a 
quorum in order to transact business in the House and pass 
bills.83  
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In January 2001, the legislature convened for a week 
and again dealt with several important constitutional 
amendments.  Unlike those of the first session, most of 
these legislative amendments consolidated the power of the 
majority, and thus weakened democratic checks within the 
legislative branch itself.  Constitution (Amendment) Act 
No.3 of 2001 reduced the required quorum to fifty percent 
plus one, and was passed by a vote of 146 to one, with 
forty-three abstentions.84 During this time, both the MCP 
and AFORD were facing internal problems over leadership 
issues, which explained why some opposition legislators 
voted in support of the amendment. The UDF was now able to 
establish a quorum and pass bills unilaterally, raising 
concerns from civil society and religious groups about 
legislative independence from the executive.85  
During the same January 2001 one-week sitting of 
parliament, section 65 of the Constitution, which 
prohibited elected MPs from changing party affiliations, 
was amended to extend the prohibition to allow the Speaker 
to declare a seat vacant if a member joined any association 
or organization whose objectives or activities were 
political in nature. Though the bill received wide 
condemnation from opposition parties and civil society, it 
eventually passed with the required two-thirds majority.86  
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The rationale behind the opposition legislators’ 
support of the amendment was that they felt it prevented 
the executive from enticing opposition legislators to join 
the government side, and hence prevented the creation of a 
single party and a return to dictatorship. Following the 
amendment, the application of the amended section 65 was 
resented also, as it appeared to be applied selectively 
against those that had fallen out with the ruling party in 
order to intimidate and prevent legislators from 
associating with groups and organizations opposed to the 
UDF. The specific object of this amendment seemed to be to 
prevent MPs from patronizing meetings of pressure groups 
and religious groups in opposition to Muluzi’s emerging 
Third/Open Term bid.87   
Parliament voted twice on a constitutional amendment 
to repeal section 68-72, effectively eliminating the Senate 
(which had yet to be appointed).  The bill was defeated in 
2000, but tabled again in 2001. The Senate was meant to 
ensure wider representation by having representatives from 
the district councils, chiefs, and interest groups 
(including women, the disabled, farmers, minorities, 
business sectors and trade unions). Its task was to 
receive, examine and modify bills from the National 
Assembly.88 As the high court in Lilongwe was considering a 
request for an injunction from the Malawi Human Rights 
Commission and the Malawi Human Rights Resource Centre to  
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prevent the bill being tabled (on the grounds that it was 
unconstitutional) parliament quickly tabled, debated and 
passed the abolition of the Senate bill.89  
Constitution (Amendment)(No.3) Act 2001, clarified the 
majority required to pass a bill into an act of parliament, 
extended disqualification on grounds of fraud to local 
government elections as well as the president and MPs, and 
gave the National Assembly power to conduct investigations 
and subpoena any person to appear before it and its 
committees.90 Additionally, it clarified that a serving 
ombudsman could be re-appointed, ensured that the Defence 
Forces of Malawi were constituted by or under the 
Constitution, prohibited employment of any part of the 
Defence Force outside Malawi for more than ninety days, 
except with parliament’s authority, and established the 
Malawi Prisons Services.91 The amendment was important 
because it ensured that the named institutions are enacted 
under an act of parliament, thereby bringing them under the 
control and direction, of the parliament, which is good for 
democracy.  
In 2002, the Open Term Bill was introduced in 
parliament. It intended to remove the presidential term 
limit, allowing Muluzi to stand for re-election, which was 
a shift away from democratic rule. Although, an amendment 
to any section of the Constitution requires a majority vote 
of approval by the people of Malawi in a referendum, 
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parliament bypassed the vote and discussed the amendment of 
section 83 (term of president).92 This development 
demonstrates the trouble the democratization process was 
going through in Malawi.  
The idea to allow Muluzi stand again, contrary to the 
required constitutional two-term limit was propagated by 
his close cabinet ministers, including Dumbo Lemani and 
Lilian Patel, in liaison with the UDF regional governor for 
the south, Davis Kapito, who declared during public rallies 
that the UDF was full of madeya (maize husks) and only 
Muluzi could lead the party to victory. Although Muluzi 
kept silent, he was generally perceived to be the power 
behind the idea.93  
On July 4, 2002, amid reports that some opposition MPs 
had been paid by Muluzi to support the bill, Khwauli Msiska 
(AFORD) moved it as a private member’s bill to demonstrate 
opposition support. With ninety-five seats in the House, 
UDF needed thirty-three votes for the amendment to pass; 
however, the vote was three short of the required two-
thirds majority for a constitutional amendment as twenty-
nine opposition MPs and one independent voted for the 
amendment(125 to fifty-nine, with three abstentions).94  
Attorney General and Minister of Justice Henry Phoya 
introduced the new Third Term Bill during an extraordinary 
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two-day sitting in January 2003. While the Open Term Bill 
would have eliminated presidential term limits, the Third 
Term Bill called for an increase in the presidential term 
limits from two to three consecutive terms.95 The 
legislature debated the bill extensively, but following 
disagreements on implementation, it was referred back to 
the Legal Affairs Committee for fine tuning. It never 
resurfaced after becoming apparent that it was not going to 
get the required two-third majority. The defeat of the Open 
Term Bill and the abandonment of the Third Term Bill saved 
the democratic regime.96 The bills failed largely because of 
the presidential aspirations of key UDF legislators, and 
their supporters within parliament. Although driven by 
personal interest, the action nevertheless contributed to 
maintaining democracy by blocking further consolidation of 
executive power. Unfortunately, the defeat also set off a 
struggle for power within the UDF that, as the next chapter 
shows, fundamentally weakened the legislature.  
Lastly in 2003, Standing Order 116 (1) was amended to 
make it a requirement to publish a bill and make copies for 
all members at least twenty-eight days between the tabling 
of bill and the debates.97 Using the provisions as stated in 
Standing Order 117(1), this twenty-eight-day period is 
frequently waived. Justification for waivers has been 
attributed to postal delays, time constraints, urgency and 
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consequences to the nation of not passing the motion, and 
include the time when the bill should be tabled.98   
Thoughthe waiver is a good development, the way it has been 
used has resulted in MPs having little time to prepare 
themselves for debates, resulting in parliament passing 
bill without much scrutiny and debate. 
In summary, this section demonstrates how 
parliamentary authority and democracy were undermined 
mainly during the period of 1999-2004. Though some 
amendments were good for democracy in that they 
strengthened parliament authority, the majority undermined 
it. As shown in the discussion, from 1999 to 2004, most of 
the bills passed strengthened the powers of the majority 
and weakened those of the minority. However, despite this 
challenge, personal aspirations helped contain the 
situation when parliament voted against changing the 
section that added term limits for the executive, 
demonstrating how important personal interests can be for 
the survival of democracy. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The historical analysis of the legislature in Malawi 
since the dawn of multiparty politics from 1994 to 2004 
demonstrates that the legislature has been able to exercise 
its functions. In terms of oversight, parliament was able 
to reveal irregularities in government departments which 
resulted in some individuals being dropped from cabinet. 
Furthermore, MPs exercised oversight regarding the HIV/AIDS 
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problem to ensure that their constituents were cared for by 
the government. This raised their standing in the eyes of 
their constituents. Again, by providing for their 
constituencies in terms of health-care systems, schools, roads 
and social facilities, they ensured their own political 
survival. Therefore, performance of their functions was 
somewhat motivated by personal interest to gain political 
mileage. Despite skepticism, some bills, like section 64, and 
65, were still passed with the required two-thirds majority, 
though the opposition initially objected.  
This could be looked at in terms of political survival 
mainly for the parties with regard to section 65, as it was 
deemed necessary to prevent demise of parties through the 
legislators changing side once in the House. The period of 
1994-9 was slightly better for democracy than the troubled 
period of 1999-2004 when challenges were posed to the 
democratization process. This is attributed to the desire by 
the incumbent to remain in power while the opposition was also 
trying to ensure its own political survival. During this 
struggle, the government side used a standoff on budget to win 
public sympathy and gained the support of NGOs, religious 
groups, mass media and the masses. This support helped to 
undermine democracy because it gave the executive an excuse to 
run government business without regard to legislature. This is 
bad for democracy since there are no checks and balance on 
executive. During this standoff the opposition was depicted as 
evil and anti-development by members of the media, further 
weakening their functions of checking the executive.99 
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III. PARLIAMENT IN MALAWI (2004-2009) 
The challenges to parliamentary authority, which began 
in the 1999-2004 period and continued to manifest in the 
period 2004-2009, greatly affected how parliament performed 
its core functions. The previous chapter demonstrated that 
parliament was able to rise above party politics to ensure 
that the democratic process was not derailed.  
This chapter shows that most of the authority 
parliament had accumulated in the previous decade was 
undermined by the power struggle unleashed by the failure 
of Muluzi’s third term bid. This affected parliament’s 
performance of its main functions during the period of 
2004-9 and ultimately enabled the executive to bypass and 
place the legislature in a subordinate position, a recipe 
for a return to autocratic rule. The subordinate position 
of parliament was dictated by section 59(1) of the 
Constitution, which gives the president power to determine 
the place and time of the sitting of parliament (or 
prorogue its sitting) in consultation with the Speaker. In 
the face of the power struggle, the president used this 
provision unilaterally to call parliament, and once 
government bills passed to prorogue it.100  
 Following the defeat of the Open/Third Term Bills, 
Muluzi handpicked Bingu wa Mutharika to run as the UDF 
candidate in the May 2004 presidential election. Speaking 
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on state-controlled television, Muluzi said that since 
there was little time before elections would be held, it 
was important to tell the nation the way forward to ensure 
a successful election and a smooth transition. He announced 
that the UDF National Executive Committee had endorsed 
Mutharika’s candidacy and asked him (Muluzi) to stay on as 
the party’s national chairman.101  
It was widely believed that Mutharika, a political 
unknown, would be Muluzi’s puppet. Muluzi conducted most of 
the campaign, only allowing Mutharika to speak for a few 
minutes at a time.102 Mutharika won the presidential 
elections with thirty-five percent of the popular vote, 
while John Tembo of MCP had twenty-seven percent, and 
Gwanda Chakuamba of Mgwirizano coalition (Republican Party, 
an MCP breakaway, and six other smaller parties, excluding 
National Democratic Alliance [NDA]) had twenty-six percent. 
The UDF won forty-nine seats in parliament, MCP sixty 
seats, Mgwirizano twenty-seven seats, independent 
legislators thirty-eight seats and other small parties (not 
in the coalition), fourteen seats.103 Most of the 
independent legislators (twenty-eight) came from the 
southern UDF stronghold, and were in fact former UDF  
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members who had worked against the third term bid and 
subsequently been defeated in party primary elections by 
candidates loyal to Muluzi.  
Mutharika made it clear from his first day in office 
that he was no puppet. In his inauguration speech, he 
announced that he would not tolerate corruption in his 
government and that those who broke the law while he was in 
power would be brought to justice. The arrest of Humphrey 
Mvula immediately followed, which UDF Secretary General 
Kennedy Makwangwala argued was like arresting the UDF 
itself.104 Mutharika’s cabinet appointments were delayed, 
but ultimately included no one close to Muluzi. This set 
him on a collision course with his predecessor and other 
UDF top leaders.105  
Mutharika also faced a possible threat in parliament 
as the UDF again failed to win a majority. Within a few 
months, however, some non-UDF legislators had decided to 
support executive-sponsored legislation in exchange for 
personal benefits and ministerial positions. In June 2004, 
Gwanda Chakuamba accepted a ministerial position, 
delivering most Mgwirizano MPs to the UDF coalition.106 Less 
than two weeks later, Brown Mpinganjira rejoined the UDF in 
a deal that delivered NDA legislators to the UDF (in 
contravention of section 65, which later brought 
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repercussions). Most independent MPs then joined the UDF 
coalition in recognition that it was emerging as the 
governing majority. In total, over a hundred legislators 
backed the UDF, which thus gained majority control and was 
then able to pass legislation, including executive-
sponsored bills.107 
Mutharika’s tough stand on corruption created many 
enemies both within parliament and in his own UDF party. 
These enemies became bent on frustrating his exercise of 
power.108 Mutharika stopped attending UDF party meetings on 
the grounds that he was not being given the respect due to 
him as president. In February 2005, he surprised everyone 
by announcing on radio that he had resigned from the UDF 
and formed his own Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
because of irreconcilable differences with Muluzi (who 
remained UDF party Chairman).109 Some UDF and opposition 
legislators joined Mutharika’s party while others remained 
with the UDF, plunging parliament into disarray.   
In June 2005, Speaker of Parliament Rodwell 
Munyenyembe collapsed as he attempted to maintain order 
during a debate on impeaching the president, and he later 
died. The UDF-initiated impeachment went ahead but 
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ultimately failed.110 Following the failure of the 
impeachment, led by the remnant UDF and MCP, non-DPP 
legislators in 2006 invoked Section 65 of the Constitution, 
and asked the Speaker to declare vacant the seats of those 
legislators who had joined the DPP.111 During a 
Constitutional Review Conference in 2006, President 
Mutharika asked the Supreme Court to consider the 
constitutionality of section 65, arguing that it 
contradicted section 32 of the same constitution, which 
provides for freedom of association, and could not be 
abridged since it was entrenched in the Bill of Rights. The 
Supreme Court in 2007 ruled that section 65 was valid and 
the Speaker could declare vacant the seats of the 
legislators in question.112 In June 2007, immediately 
following the court’s ruling on section 65, the affected 
legislators obtained an exparte injunction restraining 
Speaker Louis Chimango from implementing section 65.113 This 
set in motion a series of legal battles, which severely 
limited legislative functions for the rest of the term.114 
A. PARLIAMENTARY EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT 
The Public Appointments Committee, which can veto 
appointment of senior public officers without explanation, 
between 2005 and 2009 refused to confirm chief justice, 
auditor general, director of the Anti-Corruption Bureau and 
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inspector general of Police appointees, although the 
nominees were clearly qualified.115 Mutharika’s appointee 
for inspector general of Police, Mary Nangwale, requested 
judicial review after her appointment was vetoed by 
Parliament on March 30, 2005. The court, however, upheld 
parliament’s decision on the grounds that the courts did 
not have jurisdiction to review legislative appointment 
decisions.116 As a result, these bodies could not function 
fully, so parliamentary oversight actions had a negative 
impact on the functioning of executive institutions.117  
In other cases, parliament failed to act at all.  The 
Committee on Agriculture and Natural Resources, which is 
mandated to monitor the distribution and use of 
agricultural inputs, failed to investigate a scandal 
involving the distribution of 2,000 fertilizer coupons to 
ministers and DPP legislators (to be distributed as 
patronage). After the DPP had summoned those involved, 
Dzoole Mwale, chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on 
Agriculture and Natural Resources, announced that his 
committee would summon the same individuals on the same 
issue.118 However, nothing more was ever reported on the 
investigation.  
Finally, parliament refused to fund the state run MBC 
and Malawi Television (TVM) for the 2007/8 and 2008/9 
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budget years, on the grounds that they functioned as 
propaganda tools of the executive, rather than providing 
Malawians objective and balanced news and information.119 In 
response, the two institutions vowed to use other means 
available rather than depend on government funding alone 
(according to an act establishing MBC it is against the its 
establishment to engage in business activities at the 
expense of public programs).120 The Media Council of Malawi 
(MCM) and Media Institute of Southern Africa Malawi Chapter 
(MISA Malawi) expressed their anger, arguing that the 
problems with MBC and TVM could best be dealt with by 
legislation that parliament refused to take up.121 Other 
commentators argued that by denying the two broadcasters 
funding, parliament compromised its oversight function 
since it could no longer hold them accountable.122  
Parliamentary oversight of itself was meanwhile 
undermined by executive intervention.123 An inquiry by the 
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Parliamentary Service Commission found Clerk of Parliament 
Katopola guilty of flouting procurement procedures by 
awarding her company, Monik Trends, a tender to provide 
photocopying services to the National Assembly which earned 
her K85,000 (about $600). As parliament prepared to remove 
her as the clerk, the president issued a pardon. The 
president’s chief advisor, Dr. Hetherwick Ntaba claimed 
that Katopola could not be removed by parliament because 
she was appointed by the president.124  
Starting in 2007, when the courts upheld 
constitutionality of section 65, non-DPP legislators 
refused to discuss any bills until section 65 was dealt 
with. In response, the president, using the powers vested 
in him by section 59(1)(b) of the Constitution, prorogued 
that sitting of the House.125 This in turn made legislators 
even more uncompromising, and the president then warned 
that he could prorogue parliament permanently and run the 
government without it.126 Following that threat, non-DPP 
legislators started to cooperate and get involved in the 
debate, hoping that once the budget was passed section 65 
would be next. Immediately after the budget was passed, 
however, the president prorogued the sitting of parliament, 
thus giving it no time to exercise executive oversight 
function.  
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B. LEGISLATORS EXERCISE OF CONSTITUENCY SERVICE 
Legislators generally performed better in constituency 
service than in the other core functions, though worse than 
in the previous decade. For instance, Getrude Mkandawire, a 
legislator in Mzimba-Solora constituency helped in securing 
food aid and fertilizer subsidy coupons for her constituents, 
thereby ensuring food sufficiency.127 Legislators continued 
helping with the purchase of coffins, ferrying patients to 
hospitals, and attending church fundraising events, weddings 
and engagement ceremonies.128 Legislators also remained in 
the forefront working with chiefs to mobilize the masses in 
developmental projects like molding bricks for the 
construction of schools, teachers’ houses, and clinics.  
Though some MPs performed constituency service, in other 
constituencies, especially in the south where most of the 
affected MPs came from, this became a problem. The problem 
was worse with self-help projects, especially in areas where 
the chiefs did not support the party of the MP. In such 
cases, chiefs refused to cooperate with legislators, seeking 
to undermine their support by depicting them as failures. The 
situation was the same in areas where counselors and 
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legislators came from different parties.129 Furthermore, MPs 
threatened with the loss of their seats under Section 65 
spent much of their time in courts getting injunctions to 
prevent the Speaker from acting. Others, feared the loss of 
their seats, did not want to get very involved lest they 
labor in vain. This alienated the affected MPs from their 
constituents, adversely affecting the performance of 
constituency service.  The rationale behind this was that MPs 
would only get involved in developmental projects when they 
would be able to consolidate their power bases.130 
C. HOW PARLIAMENT EXERCISED THE POWER TO LEGISLATE 
The political struggle over control of parliament also 
disrupted meaningful debate and consideration of bills. 
Most parliamentary disagreements in the 2007/8 and 2008/9 
sittings arose out of the conduct of business. Opposition 
legislators complained that the leader of the House was 
changing the order of business in the House in disregard of 
what was being discussed in the Business Committee (which 
is mandated to produce conduct of business during 
parliamentary sittings). These disagreements resulted in 
deadlocks and adjournments, which limited the available 
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time to discuss important bills.131 During the 2008/9 
parliamentary sitting, the clerk of parliament referred the 
Malawi-Mozambique Electricity Interconnection Bill before 
it was passed in the House to the president for assent. The 
Speaker took personal responsibility, claiming it was 
because of some faults in the system. This development 
represented some form of executive appropriation of 
parliamentary power. According to section 73 of the 
constitution (Presidential Assent), once bills have been 
discussed and passed by the required vote, the Clerk of 
Parliament compiles and sends the bills to the president 
who must assent within 21 days. If he does not assent, the 
bill goes back to the House and it passes through the same 
process until an assent is reached. The illegal assent was 
rescinded following media revelations of the irregularity. 
132 
The non-DPP majority MPs were not even prepared to pass 
legislation offered by their own party members. During the 
2008 sitting of parliament a UDF member of the Committee on 
Media proposed a private motion to amend the MBC act, placing 
the state-owned MBC and TVM under an independent body to 
guarantee some coverage of the opposition. Opposition 
legislators, including those who had complained of lack of 
coverage during previous campaigns, voted the bill down, 
amidst shouts of “kodi umangolota zokhala ku opposition eti,” 
(so you do not dream of ever being in the government at some 
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point).133 The implication for the opposition MPs was that 
changing the Act would not serve their interests once they 
were in power and thus in position to use the two 
institutions as they saw fit. During 2007/8 and 2008/9 
parliament sittings, MPs also refused to bow to public 
pressure to repeal the Witchcraft Act, which makes it a crime 
for one to claim practicing witchcraft or call another person 
a witch.134  
Tembo’s majority coalition refused to participate in any 
debate during the sitting of parliament dedicated to passing 
the budget, until section 65 was dealt with.135 Popular 
dissatisfaction with the refusal to pass the budget led to 
demonstrations all over the country, and especially at the 
parliament building. In some cases the demonstrations turned 
violent. In August 2007, demonstrators hurled stones at 
parliament building and passing cars belonging to the 
legislators and prevented the MPs from leaving the building 
in an effort to force them pass the budget.136  The Daily 
Times spoke for the people at large, and in an edition on 
July 18, 2007, expressed dismay by stating it was hopelessly 
disappointing that the opposition legislators were failing to 
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pay attention to the pleas and wishes of the masses, chiefs, 
leaders of NGOs, students, clergy, and lawyers who wanted the 
MPs to debate the budget first. The paper argued that it was 
disappointing, because MPs were instead behaving as master 
and not servants of the people.137 Nevertheless, during the 
2008/9 budget sitting the opposition MPs still maintained 
their position and only passed the budget (in August) after 
the president threatened to close parliament. Once the budget 
was passed, the president adjourned the sitting before 
section 65 could be dealt with.138 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter demonstrates how the struggle for control 
of parliament by parties in the House greatly impeded any 
meaningful discussions. In the face of the power struggle, 
parliament and its committees struggled to exercise the 
core functions in the period 2004-9. This was complicated 
by the uncompromising stance of non-DPP legislators, 
resulting in the president invoking section 59(1) to 
prorogue it. By constantly invoking section 59(1) between 
2007 and 2008, parliament could hardly exercise its 
authority.  
As result of this subordinate position relative to 
executive, parliament authority was greatly undermined and 
in the face of lack of proper checks of and balances, the 
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democratization process stagnated. Power struggles within 
parliament and its subordinate position help to explain why 
after fifteen years since Malawi attained multiparty 
politics, Malawi is still in the middle on the 
authoritarian-democracy chart. This observation greatly 
supports Barkan’s argument about legislature: weak ones 
cannot effectively perform their oversight duties, while 
strong ones positively contribute to the democratization 
process by acting as an effective check and balance on the 
executive.139   
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The above analysis demonstrates that although 
parliament faced some challenges in its first period (1994-
1999) it was able to conduct business. This can be 
attributed to the fact that during this period there were 
no serious issues to the political survival of the 
legislators.  
The challenges that were there, such as the lack of a 
majority in the House, were settled by entering into a 
coalition and changing the constitution to accommodate the 
change. Challenges to party survival as a result of 
legislator defections were solved under section 65. Since 
these changes did not seriously affect the balance of power 
between parties or the survival of individual legislators, 
parliament managed to conduct its business without the 
serious challenges that faced the succeeding parliament. 
During the second term (1999-2004), parliament came 
under real challenges which affected its functions and 
moved it away from the path it had started during the first 
term. Though legislators managed to perform constituency 
service, legislation, and executive oversight, these were 
overshadowed by the way parliament used constitutional 
amendments to weaken checks on the power of the legislative 
majority. Though these amendments were made legally, they 
had a negative impact on democracy. Political survival 
proved instrumental in the failure to pass the Open/Third 
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Term Bills.140 Mpinganjira and others saw Muluzi’s ambition 
to extend his mandate as a threat to their own political 
ambitions, and hence worked to block passage of the 
amendment, serving the interests of democracy indirectly.  
In the subsequent parliamentary sittings (2004-9), the 
power struggle in the House and the need for survival of 
the DPP in parliament and those MPs who had moved to DPP 
effectively immobilized parliament.  
Since the beginning of multipartyism, the parliament 
in Malawi has been faced with problems that have affected 
its main functions and help to explain why Malawi is still 
in the middle on the democratic-authoritarian spectrum. 
Although section 89(3) and (4) of the Constitution give the 
legislature oversight function over the executive, 
parliament always played a subordinate role.141  
The subordinate position of parliament is dictated by 
section 59(1) of the Constitution, which allows the 
president in consultation with the speaker to determine the 
place and time of sitting and also bestows the power to 
prorogue parliament. Additionally, by requiring the 
president to call parliament in consultation with the 
speaker, it has compromised the independence of parliament. 
This means the president can decide to delay the sitting of 
parliament if he deems that the bills proposed for 
discussion are not in his best interest. The set-back with 
this is that parliamentary meetings have been placed at the 
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mercy of the executive, and as shown, have compromises its 
functions in the face of power struggle. It is therefore, 
important for parliament to take steps toward remedying 
this anomaly by amending section 59(1) of the Constitution 
to ensure it retains the power to hold the executive 
accountable. Until the amendment is made, parliament will 
continue to be subordinated to the executive and this will 
negatively impact on parliament’s ability to exercise its 
functions.  
Furthermore, though parliament has been given the 
power to hold the executive accountable, it still lacks the 
necessary enforcement mechanisms. Enforceability signifies 
the capacity of parliament to reprimand or impose sanctions 
on public office holders who go against their duties. The 
ability to enforce its decisions enables parliament to 
avoid an abuse of power or the neglect of duties while 
enabling corrective measures. Unfortunately for the 
parliament in Malawi, it lacks this feature to penalize 
representatives of the executive for failing to perform 
their duties. This was clearly demonstrated in the Field 
York case where, despite the revelations parliament could 
do nothing more for lack of an enforcement mechanism.142   
Another factor affecting the functioning of parliament 
is the lack of meeting time. In order for parliament to be 
objective and effective it needs ample meeting time so that 
members can study bills, conduct research, seek 
professional advice on policy issues and consult their 
constituencies. Only when parliamentarians are well-
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informed will they be able to offer any tangible advice and 
properly hold the executive accountable. Unfortunately for 
Malawi, parliamentary sessions have not been long enough to 
provide the members with the opportunity to do research, 
study the bills and consult. As a result, debates in the 
House since the beginning of multiparty politics have been 
done in a manner that makes it difficult to have informed 
debated resulting in bills being passed without meaning 
contributions from the MPs. Despite the Constitution 
stipulating that parliament should meet at least twice a 
year, there has not been enough time since it only meets 
for seventy-five to one hundred days a year.  
Worse yet, in the face of the power struggle, 
parliament met only to discuss the budget and other 
government-sponsored bills. In some cases MPs opposing 
Mutharika refused to contribute anything toward the debate 
and allowed those on the government side to proceed with 
business. Sadly for democracy, once the bills were passed, 
the executive rushed to prorogue parliament indefinitely. 
Parliament needs time to scrutinize bills, conduct research 
and consult with constituencies and experts in order to 
have informed debates. That being the case, postal delays, 
time constraints and urgency of the bills should not be 
used as excuses to waive the twenty-eight-day requirement, 
as doing so negatively affects the democratization process. 
What is required is that the clerk should plan well ahead 
and ensure that all bills have been given ample study time 
before conducting debates.  
Committees are an important part of parliament because 
over time they gain specialty in certain policy fields and 
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members gains considerable expertise, which is vital in 
questioning and countering bills and motions emanating from 
the executive. Consequently, the level of the expertise of 
committees determines the degree of influence on policy 
making.143  
In Malawi Parliament, the committee members serve in 
their respective committees for a period of a year before 
being moved to another committee. This implies that the MPs 
rarely gain the necessary expertise to objectively 
challenge executive-sponsored bills and motions. Since 
members are always moving from one committee to another, 
knowledge gained in one committee becomes useless since it 
cannot be used in a different committee.144 This creates a 
lack of continuity affecting the overall functioning of the 
various committees, as members are always on the move and 
cannot see the programs they start through to the finish. 
Members are also not always assigned to committees 
based on merits, capacity or interest, as personal 
favoritism tends to play a role in the assignments.145 By 
having members who are not committed to or do not know 
their tasks, the committees are rendered ineffective from 
the beginning. Therefore, in order to have capable 
committees, party leaders should ensure that the MPs 
assigned to different committees have the interest and 
knowledge.  
                     
143 Patel and Tostensen, “Parliamentary-Executive Relations,” 4-5. 
144 My personal experience interacting with members of the 
parliamentary committee on defence.  
145 Patel and Tostensen, “Parliamentary-Executive Relations,” 14. 
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With regard to term limits for committee members, it 
is important for parliament to change the standing orders 
to enable the members to stay longer, so that the knowledge 
gained is not wasted, as is the case now. Furthermore, 
staying longer in one committee will enable members to see 
the projects through and find remedies where necessary. 
 Lack of resources is another problem challenging the 
committees exercising the oversight function. Only few 
committees do have funding and in most cases with the 
support of donor community.146 For those committees that are 
dormant, the onus is on the chairs to be proactive and 
revive them. It is only when the committees are active, 
that donors may be more willing to come forward with 
assistance to support their respective programs. 
Furthermore, parliament must make efforts to ensure that 
the treasury does not cut budgets for committees as they 
are vital for an effective and efficient parliament. 
Using its powers to veto appointments of individuals 
without giving reasons, the committee has at times misused 
this power by vetoing appointments on political grounds, 
affecting the functioning of certain governmental 
departments and impacting accountability. It is important 
for the opposition to realize that being the opposition 
does not mean opposing everything government does, but 
rather giving it guidance, since the opposition is also  
 
                     
146 Patel and Tostensen, “Parliamentary-Executive Relations,” 14. 
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part of the government. Although the power to veto is good 
for democracy, it must not be done to the level where it 
renders some governmental departments unaccountable due to 
lack of confirmed officials to take responsibility. 
MPs need to realize that the society at large has 
placed a responsibility on them to check on executive 
power, represent them, provide constituency service and 
legislate. Such being the case they need to perform these 
functions with some objectivity or risk the wrath of the 
electorates. This was demonstrated in the 2009 elections 
when almost seventy-five percent of MPs failed were 
unsuccessful in maintaining their seats for failing to 
perform their functions.  
This discussion has demonstrated how the need for 
political survival determines the functioning of parliament 
and explains why MPs will sometimes behave in a particular 
way. Where the need for political survival seems not to 
exceedingly threaten one’s political career, 
parliamentarians will behave differently and support it, 
but when it greatly affects their political careers they 
will stand against it. 
The case in question is how parliamentarians handled 
section 65 and the Open/Third Term. In the former, almost 
no members perceived section 65 as a threat to their 
political careers on the face value, and hence most of them 
supported it despite receiving some condemnation from civil 
society organizations. Furthermore, it was supported 
because it was deemed to support democracy by preventing 
elected legislators from changing parties once inside the 
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House and help to preserve the existing parties. 
Conversely, the Open/Third Term Bill was not supported by 
all because it threatened the political careers of some 
individuals who felt Muluzi’s efforts to stand beyond the 
constitutional term limits negatively affected their 
political careers. This accounts for the opposition that 
Open/Third Term Bill received. The case was no different 
with section 65 during 2004-9, when forty-one MPs got 
injunctions preventing the Speaker from declaring their 
seats vacant. Unlike 1999-2004, in 2004-9 application of 
section 65 affected the survival of individual MPs, and 
faced with the uncertainty of retaining those seats in case 
of a rerun, they were ready to fight. From this it can be 
argued that when MPs perceive some actions as a threat to 
their political survival, they will resist and fight 
against it. When the actions pose no threat, they may 
support them even if they do wholly support the 
actions/bills in question. 
Considering that parliament is part of the decision-
making process, legislators must as much as possible try to 
be restrained and objective during debates to avoid 
unnecessary deadlocks as has been the case between 2004 and 
2009. It is only when parliament is fully exercising its 
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